This might be proprietary software.
|2019-11-21||CVE-2019-19191||Shibboleth Service Provider (SP) 3.x before 3.1.0 shipped a spec file that calls chown on files in a directory controlled by the service user (the shibd account) after installation. This allows the user to escalate to root by pointing symlinks to files such as /etc/shadow.||Service_provider||N/A|
|2019-11-07||CVE-2010-2450||The keygen.sh script in Shibboleth SP 2.0 (located in /usr/local/etc/shibboleth by default) uses OpenSSL to create a DES private key which is placed in sp-key.pm. It relies on the root umask (default 22) instead of chmoding the resulting file itself, so the generated private key is world readable by default.||Debian_linux, Service_provider||N/A|
|2017-11-16||CVE-2017-16852||shibsp/metadata/DynamicMetadataProvider.cpp in the Dynamic MetadataProvider plugin in Shibboleth Service Provider before 2.6.1 fails to properly configure itself with the MetadataFilter plugins and does not perform critical security checks such as signature verification, enforcement of validity periods, and other checks specific to deployments, aka SSPCPP-763.||Debian_linux, Service_provider||8.1|
|2015-03-31||CVE-2015-2684||Shibboleth Service Provider (SP) before 2.5.4 allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted SAML message.||Debian_linux, Service_provider||N/A|