Product:

Anythingllm

(Mintplexlabs)
Repositories

Unknown:

This might be proprietary software.
#Vulnerabilities 27
Date Id Summary Products Score Patch Annotated
2024-02-27 CVE-2024-0759 Should an instance of AnythingLLM be hosted on an internal network and the attacked be explicitly granted a permission level of manager or admin, they could link-scrape internally resolving IPs of other services that are on the same network as AnythingLLM. This would require the attacker also be able to guess these internal IPs as `/*` ranging is not possible, but could be brute forced. There is a duty of care that other services on the same network would not be fully open and accessible... Anythingllm 7.5
2024-02-27 CVE-2024-0551 Enable exports of the database and associated exported information of the system via the default user role. The attacked would have to have been granted access to the system prior to the attack. It is worth noting that the deterministic nature of the export name is lower risk as the UI for exporting would start the download at the same time, which once downloaded - deletes the export from the system. The endpoint for exporting should simply be patched to a higher privilege level. Anythingllm 7.1
2024-02-27 CVE-2024-0763 Any user can delete an arbitrary folder (recursively) on a remote server due to bad input sanitization leading to path traversal. The attacker would need access to the server at some privilege level since this endpoint is protected and requires authorization. Anythingllm 8.1
2024-02-26 CVE-2024-0436 Theoretically, it would be possible for an attacker to brute-force the password for an instance in single-user password protection mode via a timing attack given the linear nature of the `!==` used for comparison. The risk is minified by the additional overhead of the request, which varies in a non-constant nature making the attack less reliable to execute Anythingllm 5.9
2024-02-26 CVE-2024-0439 As a manager, you should not be able to modify a series of settings. In the UI this is indeed hidden as a convenience for the role since most managers would not be savvy enough to modify these settings. They can use their token to still modify those settings though through a standard HTTP request While this is not a critical vulnerability, it does indeed need to be patched to enforce the expected permission level. Anythingllm 8.8
2024-02-26 CVE-2024-0440 Attacker, with permission to submit a link or submits a link via POST to be collected that is using the file:// protocol can then introspect host files and other relatively stored files. Anythingllm 6.5
2024-02-26 CVE-2024-0455 The inclusion of the web scraper for AnythingLLM means that any user with the proper authorization level (manager, admin, and when in single user) could put in the URL ``` http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance ``` which is a special IP and URL that resolves only when the request comes from within an EC2 instance. This would allow the user to see the connection/secret credentials for their specific instance and be able to manage it... Anythingllm 7.5